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Abstract 
Using data on marginal interest rates of loan and deposit products by Spanish banks, we 
find that the level of interest rates on loans (deposits) across geographic markets 
decrease (increase) with the number of banks in each market, and that the level of 
interest rates on loans increases with the level of interest rates of deposits. We also find 
that the dispersion of interest rates of both loans and deposits increase with the number 
of banks. This evidence is interpreted as evidence of customer’s search costs in retail 
banking, consistent with predictions from the Carlson and McAfee (1983) model of market 
competition with search costs. 
 
Keywords: Interest rate dispersion, market structure, search costs. 
JEL: D83, G21. 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0825 
1 Introduction 
The number of firms in a market is a key variable for competition analysis and policy. The realistic 
observation that it is costly for buyers to discover the lowest selling price in a market (search costs) 
widens the theoretical predictions on the relationship between market structure and level and 
dispersion of equilibrium prices, complicating market analysis and policy formulation1. In this vein, 
under search costs, some models predict a positive association between the number of sellers and 
the average equilibrium selling prices [Rosenthal (1980); Varian (1980)], whereas others predict a 
negative one [Carlson and McAfee (1983)]. In addition, predictions on the relationship between 
price dispersion and the number of sellers differ depending on the assumptions about search 
activity, the distribution of search costs across buyers, and the heterogeneity of producers: Carlson 
and McAfee (1983), Varian (1980), Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2004) predict a positive 
association; whereas Baye and Morgan (2001) and Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004) predict a 
negative one, and Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) predict that the relationship depends on 
the endogenously determined intensity of consumer search. 
Empirical research has provided general support for the hypothesis that costly information 
acquisition by buyers breaks the law of one price2.  However, papers that test alternative theoretical 
predictions about market structure and the values of the moments of the equilibrium distribution of 
prices are scarce and non coincident. For example, the same evidence of a negative association 
between number of sellers and level and dispersion of market prices leads to a rejection of the 
hypothesis that search models explain the empirical evidence in Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck 
(2004) and to an acceptance of it in Dahlby and West (1986) and in Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 
(2004). The development of Internet-based electronic markets provides new opportunities for 
empirical research on price dispersion, but differences in empirical findings continue3. 
In this paper we use a large proprietary database to study interest rate levels 
and dispersion in twenty-two loan and deposit products offered by Spanish banks in fifty 
different geographic markets over the 1989 to 2003 period. Therefore, we have data for a whole 
industry in a country over a long period. The main research question is to examine the effect of 
market structure variables (i.e., number of banks in a province) on the average level and dispersion 
of interest rates in each bank product market. The null hypotheses, drawn from the Carlson and 
McAfee (1983) model of competition in retail markets with search costs, are confronted with 
alternative ones drawn from other models of price dispersion. The fact that banks collect deposits 
and grant loans justifies the extension of the Carlson and McAfee model to vertically related 
product markets, as is the case with bank deposit products and loan products. 
                                                                          
1. Stigler (1961) opened the research path on how imperfect buyers’ information can cause price dispersion in markets with 
homogeneous products. Further theoretical work has been devoted to refine Stigler’s predictions and to provide formal 
conditions under which price dispersion may be an equilibrium solution in non-differentiated product markets [Rothschild 
(1973); Rosenthal (1980); Varian (1980); Burdett and Judd (1983); Carlson and McAfee (1983); Stahl (1989); Anderson and 
Renault (1999); Baye and Morgan (2001); and Anderson and de Palma (2004)]. Carlson and McAfee, for brick and mortar retail 
markets, and Baye and Morgan, for Internet based electronic markets, specifically address the question of how market 
structure affects the moments of the equilibrium distribution of prices. Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) extend Stahl’s 
model and show that the number of firms has an undetermined effect on price level and dispersion. 
2. Existing evidence in support of search costs, as an explanation for observed price dispersion, comes from papers that link 
price dispersion to product-specific inflation [Stigler and Kindhal (1970); Van Hoomissen (1988); Reinsdorf (1994)], to differences 
in search costs and search activity across markets [Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979); Dahlby and West (1986); Hayes and 
Ross (1998); Brown and Goolsbee (2002); Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004)], and to the frequency of repeated purchases of 
products [Sorensen (2000)]. Other papers that provide evidence consistent with search costs are Hortacçu and Syverson 
(2004) and Hong and Shum (2006). The role of exchange rates and product differentiation to explain price dispersion is 
analyzed in Goldberg and Verboven (2001). 
3. Ellison and Ellison (2005) show the discrepancies found in studies that use Internet-based commerce data.  
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Our database is a panel of interest rates charged by banks for new loans granted during 
the quarter and of interest rates paid in new deposit transactions, also during the respective 
quarter. This database has important advantages: First, interest rates are the prices of transactions 
that took place, not just posted prices for which we do not know whether actual transactions take 
place or not. One important limitation of using posted prices, as is the case in most of the research 
on price dispersion on Internet selling sites, is that the researcher does not know whether there are 
transactions or not at prices that are different from the lowest one [Baye, Morgan and Scholten 
(2004)]. Moreover, we have data on new transactions (i.e., we have marginal interest rates), not on 
average prices. Finally, we use advanced econometric techniques to control for the endogeneity 
of the explanatory variable (number of banks in the market), a clear improvement with respect to 
Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2004), who treat the number of sellers as exogenous. 
We find that interest rate dispersion is economically relevant in the Spanish banking 
system and it persists over time. Overall, the level of interest rates in loans (deposits) decreases 
(increases) with the number of banks in the market, in line with Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2004) 
and with Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004). However, interest rate dispersion increases with the 
number of banks, a result that departs from existing empirical findings, but is consistent with the 
theoretical model based on Carlson and McAfee (1983). We also find that the level and dispersion 
of interest rates in loan product markets increase, respectively, with the level and dispersion of 
deposit interest rates. This result contradicts the assumption that loan and deposit markets are 
separated by the interbank market and supports models of the banking firm, such as Berlin and 
Mester (1999), where banks create a stable deposit base to implement relational lending practices. 
Carlson and McAfee’s model of sequential search, uniformly distributed search costs, 
heterogeneous producers, and Cournot-type competition is hard to adapt to Internet markets 
where the search cost of the lowest offered price tends to zero, at least in clearinghouse markets 
as those described by Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004). The more realistic assumption in 
Internet markets is that buyers either search and buy from the lowest price producer or do not 
search at all because they are loyal to particular sellers. Since our evidence contradicts predictions 
from Internet-adapted search models, the conclusion is that price formation follows different 
patterns in Internet markets than in brick and mortar markets. 
Section 2 presents the preliminary analysis of price differences in Spanish retail banking. 
Section 3 presents the theoretical predictions of the determinants of interest rate dispersion. In 
section 4 we present the explanatory variables and the empirical models used to test the 
theoretical predictions. Section 5 contains the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, in section 6 
we summarize the main results of the paper. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0825 
2 Data on interest rate level and dispersion 
The database consists of interest rates charged or paid by almost all Spanish banks in all lending 
and deposit operations. The vast majority of loans granted by Spanish banks are grouped into four 
different product classes: Receivables, Credit Line, Personal, and Mortgages. The first two are 
mainly loans to firms, and the last two are loans to households. Except for Mortgages, which are all 
long term, the rest of the loans have different maturities (i.e. from less than 3 months to more than 
3 years). Bank deposits are also classified into four main product classes: Current Accounts, 
Savings Accounts, Deposits, and Repo operations. Current and Savings accounts are liquid assets 
for depositors, while Repo operations and Deposits have maturities that range from less than three 
months to more than two years. Taking into account product class and maturity, the total number 
of products is 22: 12 loan products and 10 deposit products4.  The database contains information 
on up to 215 banks5.  At the end of each month, banks report to the Banco de España the average 
interest rate (weighted by the volume of the operation) of all transactions closed during the past 
thirty days in each of the 22 product types. Monthly data are in turn averaged into quarterly values 
(from 1989 to 2003), which are the raw numbers for interest rates that we use in this paper. 
We identify fifty different geographic markets one for each of the Spanish provinces (the 
lowest possible level of geographic desegregation permitted by the data). For each product and 
province, we only consider banks that have a significant presence in the province (at least, three 
branches) and have a relevant volume of business in that loan/deposit market (at least, eight 
months per year selling the product). National banks operate in many provinces and have an 
average market share of around 34% across provinces. We do not know the price charged by a 
national bank in a given province. In the empirical analysis reported in this paper we assume that 
national banks charge the same interest rate nationwide (since national banks advertise interest 
rates of products such as mortgages or deposits nationwide). We perform robustness analysis of 
the results excluding national banks from the data to see if the results are sensitive to this 
assumption on the pricing policy by these banks. Therefore, our interest rate variable is rijmt , the 
interest rate charged or paid by bank j (j=1 to 215) in product I (i=1 to 22) in province m (m=1 to 50) 
during quarter t (t=1 to 58). 
Table 1 shows yearly averages of daily interbank interest rates for each year from 1989 to 
2003, and average level and dispersion measures of interest rates for selected loan  products 
(Credit Line and Mortgages) and deposit products (Current Accounts and Deposits)6.  The 
interbank interest rate was around 15% at the end of the eighties and is only 2.75% in 2003. The 
greatest decline took place in 1993 and 1994 when the rate went from 12.25% to 7.81%. From 
1998 onwards no clear trend is detected in interbank interest rates. Loan and deposit interest rates 
follow the decreasing trend of interbank interest rates during the period. The table documents that 
dispersion in interest rates is a persistent phenomenon in Spanish retail banking. Moreover, the 
                                                                          
4. For loans: Receivables (less than 3 months; 3 months to 1 year; 1 to 3 years), Credit Line (less than 3 months; 3 months to 1 
year; 1 to 3 years; more than 3 years),  Personal (less than 3 months; 3 months to 1 year; 1 to 3 years; more than 3 years) and 
Mortgages (always more than 3 years). For deposits: Current Accounts, Savings Accounts, Deposits (less than 3 months; 3 to 6 
months; 6 months to 1 year; 1 to 2 years; more than 2 years), and Repo operations (less than 3 months; 3 to 6 months; 6 
months to 1 year). A complete description of the database can be found in Martín-Oliver, Salas and Saurina (2007). 
5. We only consider banks that are active in retail banking. Licensed banks with no activity in retail banking (i.e., wholesale 
banks), as well as foreign banks involved exclusively in investment banking, are excluded. We focus on commercial and savings 
banks, with a 95% market share. A more detailed analysis of the Spanish banking market can be found in Caminal, Gual and 
Vives (1993) and in Salas and Saurina (2003). 
6. The daily quoted interbank interest rate is taken as the basic interest rate of the economy. It is highly correlated with other 
reference interest rates. 
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coefficients of variation shown in Table 1 (that go from 0.06 in Mortgages in 1992 to 0.40 in Current 
Accounts in 2003) are in line with those reported by Dahlby and West (1986) on automobile 
insurance premiums (from 0.07 to 0.18), by Sorensen (2000) on prices of drogue products (average 
value of 0.22), and with the 0.10 of CD and book prices across e-retailers [Ellison and Ellison 
(2005)]. 
To understand better the factors that may be behind the variations observed in interest 
rates of loans and deposits in the Spanish banking industry, we perform an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the pooled data of interest rates of loans and deposits. The original interest rates are 
expressed in log differences with respect to the log of the interbank rate (ln rijmt – ln rt for loans 
ln rt – ln rijmt for deposits, where rt stands for the interbank interest rate at t), so that differences in 
interest rates are expressed in relative terms.  
 
depositsforaaaaarr
loansforaaaaarr
ijmttmjioijmtt
ijmttmjiotijmt
ε
ε
+++++=−
+++++=−
lnln
lnln                                      (1) 
 
The sources of variability in interest rates considered are: time, product class, bank, and 
province. Table 2 summarizes the results of the variance decomposition analysis7. In both loans 
and deposits, the fixed effects of time, bank, product, and province explain up to two thirds of the 
variability observed in interest rates relative to the interbank rate in Spain, although the contribution 
of each source of variability is different in loans and in deposits. For the loan products, the main 
source of relative variability in the interest rates is due to Time effects (46% of the explained 
variation). Next, the Bank specific effects account for close to 27% of the relative variability 
observed in interest rates. Product class contributes to relative variability in interest rates by 12% of 
the explained variation. Finally, there is 1.8% of relative variability in interest rates of loans explained 
by Province effects. In the case of deposits, the main source of relative variability is the Product 
class, as 87% of the explained variance is attributed to this factor, followed by Bank (7.4%), Time 
(4.3%) and Province (1.05%). 
 
                                                                          
7. The measure of contribution to the explained variance for each explanatory variable is calculated as the decrease in the sum 
of squares of the model if the respective explanatory variable is removed from the model (the so-called partial sum of squares), 
divided by the sum of squares of the model. That is, 
2
2
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R
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delmo
total
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delmo ∆
∆∆ == . The addition of the marginal contributions 
to the explained reported in the Table is not 100% because they are obtained keeping all the other explanatory variables in the 
regression (with replacement).   
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3 Models of price dispersion and hypotheses 
Models of the banking firm differ on whether they assume that loan and deposit markets 
are separated by the interbank market or that the two markets are integrated [Freixas and Rochet 
(1997)]. The hypothesis of integration has been put forward mainly in studies about the credit 
channel [Kishan and Opiela (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000)] or relational banking [Berger and 
Udell (1992), Berlin and Mester (1999)]. We assume that all bank customers do some search and 
face a positive cost for discovering the more attractive offer in the market. We also assume the 
same search model for loan than for deposit products, since there are no a priori reasons to assign 
a diffrent degree of search activity in the two product markets. 
3.1 Basic model 
The model of retail banking with search costs is adapted from Carlson and McAfee (1983). 
Customers use a sequential reservation price strategy in their search and have the correct 
perception about the price distribution. Firms differ in their costs of supplying the product. The 
distribution of the search costs across consumers in a given market m (province in our case) is 
uniform under the interval [0, Tm ]. If the density of buyers in the interval is 1/sm, then the total size of 
the market will be Tm/sm. Carlson and McAfee (1983) show that, with buyers’ randomly sampling 
with replacement, the demand function for loans of bank j in market m with Nm  banks is given by, 
( )( )*1 mjmm
m
jm RRTNs
L −−= ,  (2) 
where Rm* is the average of interest rates charged by banks in loan market m. Under similar 
assumptions about the structural parameters and search activity the supply of deposits offered to 
bank j is given by, 
( )( )*mjmm
m
jm rrTNs
D −+= 1   (3) 
where rm* is the average interest rate paid in deposit market m. 
Consider first the case where loan and deposit markets are separated by the interbank 
market with interest rate I. Let  lj represent the operating unit cost of loans and dj  represent the 
operating unit costs of deposits for bank j. If Bm is the amount borrowed or lent in the interbank 
market, and the budget constraint Dm + Bm=Lm is binding, the profit-maximizing problem of the 
bank is given by, 
( ) ( ) jmjjmjmjjm
jmr,jmR
DdrILlIRMax −−+−−  ( ) ( )32 ,.t.s . (4) 
Let  lm* and dm * be the average operating costs of loans and deposits in market m, 
respectively. Then, the first order conditions imply, after some algebraic manipulations, 
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These results are similar to those of Carlson and McAfee, adapted to loan and deposit 
markets and assuming constant returns to scale in production of banking services. Equations (5) 
and (7) refer to individual bank interest rates, and equations (6) and (8) refer to average market 
interest rates. The former will be used to formulate the hypothesis on the determinants of 
dispersion of interest rates and the latter on the determinants of average interest rates. From 
equation (5) the standard deviation, Sd, of the distribution of equilibrium interest rates of loans is 
given by  ( ) ( ) ( )jm
m
m
jm
*
mjm lSdN
N
RSdRRSd
12
1
−
−==− . A similar result is obtained for deposits from (7). 
Since 
12
1
−
−
m
m
N
N
  increases with Nm, the dispersion of the equilibrium interest rates of loans and 
deposits increases with the number of banks in the market; also, for a given number of firms, 
dispersion will be higher in markets where the differences in operating costs across firms are more 
pronounced [higher Sd (ljm)]. Notice that, under the assumption of separate loan and deposit 
markets, the dispersion of interest rates in the loan market is independent of the dispersion in the 
deposit market and vice versa. 
According to equations (6) and (8), average equilibrium interest rates of loans (deposits) 
decreases (increases) with the number of banks N and increases (decreases) with the range of 
search costs T. Interest rates on loans and deposits both increase with the interbank rate; higher 
average unit operating costs increase the average equilibrium interest  rate on loans and decreases 
that of deposits. 
3.2 Non-separation between loan and deposit markets 
Now banks use their deposits to finance the loans they grant. To simplify, we assume that all loans 
come from the bank deposits (otherwise the financial opportunity cost of loans would be a 
weighted sum of the interbank rate and of the interest rate of deposits). The profit maximizing 
problem for loans is now formulated as: 
 ( ) jmjmjmjmjm
jmr,jmR
LdlrRMax −−−  ( )2.t.s  and s.t. the supply equal to 
demand condition ( ) ( )*mjmm*mimm rrTRRT −+=−− .   (9) 
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The first order conditions of optimum imply: 
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The basic predictions on the determinants of dispersion and average equilibrium interest 
rates of loans and deposits remain unchanged with respect to those obtained under separation of 
the loan and deposit markets, although the actual effects of the exogenous variables on the 
dispersion of equilibrium interest rates is different under integration than they were under 
separation. First, under integration, the dispersion of interest rates in loans and in deposits, in both 
cases, depends on the dispersion across banks of operating costs of producing loans and of 
producing deposits [equations (10) and (12)]. Second, the coefficient of dispersion in operating 
costs across banks is now lower than what it was under separation [(Nm-1)/(4Nm-3)  is smaller than 
(Nm-1)/(2Nm-1)]. If the number of firms N is sufficiently large, the coefficient of dispersion in 
operating costs in the equation that determines the dispersion in prices converges to ¼ in the case 
of markets integration and to ½ in the case of separation. 
The comparison of the results of the Carlson and McAfee (1983) model of price dispersion 
in vertically integrated and vertically separated markets is new in the literature. We find that 
integration implies that dispersion in equilibrium prices in downstream and upstream markets will 
both be affected by the dispersion of operating costs for the two sides of the market; this is likely to 
contribute to higher equilibrium price dispersion, compared with separation, since the operating 
costs for each side of the market are unlikely to be negatively correlated. However, the weight (as a 
function of number of firms) of dispersion in unit operating costs in determining the dispersion in 
equilibrium prices is lower under integration than under separation. Consequently the overall net 
effect of vertical market integration versus separation in price dispersion is ambiguous. 
3.3 Other determinants of price dispersion 
In the absence of search costs, monopolistic competition with differentiated products and 
heterogeneous producers (i.e., different marginal costs) can create price dispersion in equilibrium 
[Perloff and Salop (1985; Barron, Taylor and Umbeck 2004)]. The theoretical prediction is that both 
price level and dispersion will decrease with the number of sellers in the market. Stahl (1989) 
considers a market with homogeneous producers, all with the same marginal cost, where buyers 
split into two groups: buyers with no search at all, so each of them knows the price that every firm 
is quoting; and uninformed buyers that perform costly search until they find a price lower than the 
respective reservation price. The Stahl model departs from Carlson and McAfee in that it assumes 
equal marginal costs across producers and search costs that are not uniformly distributed across 
buyers. The empirical prediction is that, in equilibrium, both price dispersion and average prices will 
now increase with the number of sellers in the market [Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004)]. 
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Baye and Morgan (2001) and Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004) extend the Varian (1980) 
results assuming that search costs are zero in clearing markets such as the Internet-based 
commerce, where the potential buyers receive a list of offers from different sellers. Not all of the 
buyers buy with the criterion of choosing the product with the lowest price, and strategic behavior 
by profit-maximizing sellers implies that the gap between the lowest and the next-to-the-lowest 
listed price (a measure of dispersion), and the average price listed on the page, will both decrease 
with the number of listed prices. 
Early empirical work in price dispersion under search costs investigated the factors that 
affect the incentives of buyers to invest in information about prices in contexts of repeated 
purchases. One of these factors is price inflation. The argument is that changes in the price level for 
a particular product produce obsolescence of the stock of available information about the 
distribution of prices among sellers, so it is more difficult and costly for the search process to 
reduce price dispersion [Stigler and Kindhal (1970); VanHoomisen (1988)]. Thus, price dispersion 
will increase with product specific inflation.  Another factor that affects price dispersion is the 
frequency of transactions in a repeated purchase process [Fishman and Rob (1995); Sorensen 
(2000)]. The prediction here is that a higher frequency of transactions lowers price dispersion 
because the information acquired. 
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4 Variables and empirical models 
4.1 Variables 
We postulate one empirical model to explain the level of interest rates in a province market and 
another empirical model to explain the dispersion in interest rates in each province. Since part of 
variability in observed interest rates may respond to banks’ product differentiation policies and not 
to the existence of search costs in markets with homogeneous products, in estimating the 
determinants of the level of interest rates in a given market we use bank-level data (instead of the 
average interest rates for all banks in the market as postulated by equations (6) and (8) of the 
model); this will allow us to control for bank fixed effects in the estimation. The dependent variable 
in the model that explains the level of interest rates is ln rjmt –ln It , the relative difference between 
interest rate of the bank in a given product, market and time period and the interbank rate for that 
time period. We explain relative differences because they are less sensitive to a time trend. 
The measure of interest rate dispersion in a given province will be the coefficient of 
variation: 
imt
imtijmt
imt rAvg
)rAvgr(
nrCV
∑ −
=
21
. In the robustness analysis, the coefficient of variation is 
substituted by the Range: that is the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles on the 
interest rate distribution, normalized by the mean: Range rimt / Avg imtr .. The interest rates used to 
calculate the values of the dependent variables ⎯level and dispersion⎯ correspond to the interest 
rate for the last quarter of the year, since the rest of the explanatory variables pertain to the end of 
the year. 
The main explanatory variables include the number of banks (market structure), a proxy for 
search costs, and the parameters of the distribution of deposit interest rates (in the case of loans). 
Direct evidence of operating costs of each bank in each province is not available, and, therefore, it 
is not possible to perform direct tests with this variable. The variable NBANKSimt is equal to the 
number of banks with transactions in product i in province m at the end of year t. We use the 
density of bank branches in province m and period t, DENBRANCHmt (total number of bank 
branches per Km2 in province m in year t) as a proxy, in an inverse way, of the search cost 
parameter T. To test the hypothesis of integration between loan and deposit markets we include as 
explanatory variables LEV rjmtdeposit in the level of interests model, and CV rmtdeposit, in the model of 
dispersion. We choose the product Deposits to calculate the marginal cost of lending funds for an 
integrated bank because these deposits better represent the “stable pool of deposits” referred to 
by Berlin and Mester (1999). 
The size of the market, which becomes a relevant variable when banks operate under 
decreasing or increasing returns to scale, is measured by two variables: the number of inhabitants 
of the market/province m. in period t, POPULATIONmt , and the per capita income of the province, 
PINCOMEmt . To account for the possible effect of product-specific inflation in interest rate 
dispersion we use the explanatory variable Dimt calculated as the absolute value of the average 
rate of change across banks in the interest rate of product i in time period t in province m. We also 
include the market share of loans plus deposits of national banks in the province, SHARENAmt.. A 
bank is national if it has branches in all provinces (only nine banks in the sample). The market share 
of national banks controls for possible errors resulting from not having data on the interest rates 
that they charge in each province. 
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The model to be estimated will also control for fixed effects, which include (depending on 
the equation being estimated) time dummy variables to control for the time-varying effects that are 
common to all banks (i.e., the decreasing trend in the interbank rate over time), fixed effects of 
province that capture the differences of state prices, salaries and other factors that may vary 
across markets; and bank effects (in the level equation) that capture sources of variation due to 
product differentiation by banks (branch network, complementary services, etc.). 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. Note that the 
average number of banks in each province market is large (around 30) and increasing over time. 
4.2 Empirical model 
The two main equations to be estimated are, 
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where LOAN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the product is a loan and ηm are 
province fixed effects. The number of banks and the density of branches are in logs to allow for 
nonlinear effects. Also, eq. (14) is estimated with a range variable as the dependent variable. 
Equation (13) has been estimated using instrumental variables to control for the potential 
endogeneity of NBANKS, DENBRANCH and depositjmtrLEV using the lags t-2 and t-3 of these 
variables as instruments. The Control Variables include dummy variables of time, bank, and 
province. 
The dispersion equation (14) includes the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable because of the high persistence of the coefficient of variation that remained even after 
controlling for the fixed effects. As a consequence, we apply here panel data econometric 
techniques to avoid estimation biases. The model is estimated with the system-GMM technique 
[Blundell and Bond (1998)] instead of the traditional first-difference GMM estimator because the 
latter might have problems of inconsistency when the variables used in the regression have a high 
degree of persistence (which is our case). The Control variables include province and time dummy 
variables. Estimations of the models will be evaluated through the validity of the moment conditions 
(Hansen statistic of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions) and the test of the null 
hypothesis of the absence of second-order autocorrelation of the residual term (first-order 
autocorrelation is expected since we take first differences in the variables). 
In the case of level of interest rates of loans, from (6) we expect g1<0; g2<0; and g3=0 if 
loans and deposits are separated by the interbank rate, and g3>0 if they are integrated [equation 
(11)]. For deposits, equation (8), we expect g1>0 and g2>0. If there is some time convergence in 
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interest rates, the product specific inflation will be inversely related to the average interest rate 
(g4<0). On determinants of price dispersion, equation (14), we expect h1>0, h2<0, and h3=0, if 
loans and deposits are separated markets, or h3>0 if they are integrated; we expect h1>0 and 
h2<0 also for deposits. From models that link price dispersion with product specific inflation we 
expect h4>0. From the Stahl model of homogenous sellers and non-uniform distribution of search 
costs, the main prediction that is different from Carlson and McAfee is g1>0 for loans and g1<0 for 
deposits. 
Equations (13) and (14) are specified and estimated separately for each bank product (12 
loan products and 10 deposit products). The null hypothesis of the same empirical model for the 
pool of all loans and for the pool of all deposits is rejected at high levels of significance. We also 
reject the null hypothesis that the model is the same for all products of different maturity within the 
same product class (for example the same model for all Personal loans of different maturity or the 
same model for Deposits of all maturity).  So the data justify that each maturity within each product 
class be treated as a different product market. 
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5 Results 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of estimating models (13) and (14), respectively. The number of 
observations for the estimation of the level equations varies depending on the number of banks that 
supply every product, whereas the number of observations of the dispersion regression (14) is 750 
(50 provinces and 15 time periods). The estimated coefficients shown in Table 5 are long term, 
since they have been obtained by dividing the original coefficient by one minus the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (positive and statistically significant in all estimations, 
although not reported to save space). 
The estimations of the level equations (Table 4) show that the F-tests of aggregate 
significance of the bank, province and time groups of dummy variables (individually and jointly) 
reject the null hypothesis of non-statistical relevance. The results obtained from the estimation are 
robust to the set of instruments used, as we have regressed the model using different 
combinations of instruments from t-2 up to t-4 and the sign and significance of the ⎯coefficients 
was not altered. The R2 of all the regressions was close to 0.9, in part due to the high explanatory 
power of the groups of dummy variables. Further, the validity of the estimations of the dispersion 
equation is also accepted as they passed all the consistency tests (Table 5). First, the p-value from 
the statistic of the Sargan tests for compatibility of the orthogonal conditions is close or equal to 1 
in all estimations. Second, the null hypothesis of absence of second-order autocorrelation cannot 
be rejected for any product at a significance level of 5%. Therefore, the models are well specified 
from an econometric point of view. We now describe the results under the lens of the predictions 
from the theory. 
5.1 Determinants of average interest rates 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients of ln NBANKS are positive in nine out of ten deposit products 
and statistically significant in four of them, as predicted by the Carlson and McAfee model. The sign 
of the estimated coefficients for the variable ln DENBRANCH is positive in all of the deposit 
products, and seven out of ten are statistically significant, which suggest that higher density of 
branches increases competition. 
As for the control variables that are included in the model, the level of interest rates is, in 
general, lower in larger province markets (i.e., more populated) with a high level of per capita 
income (POPULATION has nine negative signs, four significant; PINCOME has eight negative signs, 
two significant). Next, all of the statistically significant coefficients of the product-specific inflation 
variable, D, are negative, which implies that markets with lower relative change in the average 
interest rate over time are those with higher interest rates (convergence). Finally, the statistically 
significant coefficients of the SHARENA variable suggest that the presence of national banks does 
not affect the level of deposit interest rates. 
For loans, the estimated coefficient of Ln NBANK is negative, as predicted by the model, 
in all loan products but one, and it is significant in seven of them. The explanatory variable, 
LEVrmtdeposit, has a positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient for all loan products: 
in provinces with higher interest rates of deposits, the interest rates of loans are also higher. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that banks take the marginal interest rate paid for deposits 
as the marginal financial cost of their loans (integration). 
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Provinces with higher densities of branches tend to have higher average loan interest rates 
(ten out of twelve coefficients are positive, three of them statistically significant; in Mortgages, 
however, the density of branches has an unexpected negative sign). The coefficients of 
POPULATION and PINCOME are positive in some loan products and negative in others. In general, 
their estimated values are smaller in absolute values than for deposits, so the effect of the size of 
the market variables on the average interest rates of loans is less clear than in the case of deposits. 
The coefficients of the product-specific inflation variable are all negative, and all but two are 
statistically significant; evidence is thus found of the convergence effect in loan products as well. 
Six of the seven statistically significant coefficients of the variable SHARENA are negative, 
concentrated mainly in Personal loans and Mortgages. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the 
greater presence of national banks in a given province market tends to lower the average interest 
rates on loans to households, but does not affect the interest rates of loans to firms (Receivables 
and Credit lines) ⎯perhaps because local firms may find it easier to engage in relational lending 
with local lenders than with distant ones. 
5.2 Determinants of dispersion 
Table 5 shows that, for deposits, the coefficient of the number of banks is positive in seven cases 
and negative in three. Four out of the seven positive coefficients are statistically significant, while all 
of the negative coefficients are statistically insignificant. The hypothesis from Carlson and McAfee’s 
model that price dispersion will increase with the number of banks in the market cannot be 
rejected. The negative and significant sign of three estimated coefficients for density of branches is 
consistent with the prediction that dispersion decreases as the range of search costs decreases; 
however, the estimated coefficient for the variable is positive and significant in two cases. 
Consequently, overall, the conclusion as to the effect of density of branches on the interest rate 
dispersion of deposits is ambiguous. 
For loan products the estimated coefficient of the variable number of banks is positive in 
ten of the twelve loan products; seven of the ten positive coefficients are significantly different from 
zero, and none of the three negative coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore, in loan 
products, the hypothesis that interest rate dispersion increases with the number of banks is also, in 
general, supported by the data. Table 5 also shows that all three of the statistically significant 
coefficients of the density of branches variable have a negative sign, which would be consistent 
with the prediction that lower search costs decrease price dispersion. The estimated coefficient of 
the variable CVrmtdeposit is positive in eight cases and four out of five significant coefficients have a 
positive sign, which supports markets integration. The sign and statistical significance of the 
coefficients of the control variables do not show a clear pattern in both deposit and loan products. 
However, all of the significant coefficients of the variable PINCOME are negative, which suggest a 
negative effect of customers’ wealth on price dispersion. The negative sign also dominates among 
the statistically significant coefficients for the variable product-specific inflation (11 out of 13), so the 
empirical evidence suggests a negative association between product specific-inflation and price 
dispersion. 
5.3 Robustness analysis 
The empirical model (14) is estimated again with a range of interest rates, Range rmt/Avg rmt, as the 
dependent variable (Table 6). The Carlson and McAfee model predicts the same pattern of results, 
in terms of the signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables, when dispersion is measured 
by range as when it is measured by the standard deviation. The results shown in Table 6, overall, 
confirm the conclusions obtained when dispersion is measured in terms of the standard deviation 
of residual interest rates for both deposit and loan products. 
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One potential limitation of our results is that we do not know whether national banks set 
interest rates with a national policy resulting in the same interest rate in each province, or whether 
they follow local market policies. To test the extent to which the results above are sensitive to the 
assumption on interest rates of national banks we perform robustness analyses in two ways: First, 
we estimate the empirical models of average level and dispersion of interest rates excluding the 
national banks data. Second we estimate the model with the full data set excluding the share of 
national banks (SHARENA) as an explanatory variable. In all cases the main results of the empirical 
analysis are maintained (i.e., the effect of the number of banks in average interest rates and their 
dispersion, and the effect of deposit interest rates’ average and dispersion on the average and 
dispersion of loan interest rates). 
Finally, the theoretical and empirical analysis has ignored the interaction of pricing 
decisions for a multi-product bank. The original model that we test in the paper was formulated for 
single-product firms, but here we treat each bank product as a separate market. The complexity of 
this issue is out of the reach of the present paper, but we have explored the possibility that banks 
apply mixed or randomized pricing strategies to avoid being identified as low or high price sellers 
[Varian (1980); Lach (2002)]. If banks use mixed strategies to set interest rates, the correlation 
between the interest rates of each bank across different products will be low, as banks will set 
relatively high interest rates in some products and relatively low rates in others. However, there is 
an alternative prediction based on common beliefs and expectations of the bank, which predicts 
that pricing decisions of that bank across products will be highly correlated [Dahlby and West 
(1986)]. 
The actual observed correlation among banks of the interest rates of two 
different products will help to discern which of the two explanations about pricing behavior is more 
likely to be true (mixed strategies or common future expectations). To perform the test, we 
compute the Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient of interest rates across bank products 
for each quarter and for five provinces, which amounts to 66,990 correlation coefficients. 18,295 
(12,103) out of the total are statistically significant at a 5% (1%) confidence level, the vast majority 
with a positive sign. Therefore, only in 27% (18%) of the cases do we find evidence consistent with 
the hypothesis that common expectations about exogenous variables dictate the pricing strategy of 
the multi-product bank. This result contrasts with that of Dahlby and West, who find a positive and 
significant correlation in practically all cases, but it is consistent with the evidence of low correlation 
obtained by Sorensen (2000) and Lach (2002). 
The second analysis performed refers to the correlation of interest rates across products 
over time,  also measured through the Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient. The 
correlation between two consecutive years is positive and statistically significant at 5% (1%) in 91% 
(80%) of the cases in all of the periods. However, after six years (1997-2003) the number of positive 
and significant correlation coefficients has dropped to 26% (18.3%) of the total. Although the year-
to-year changes in the ranking of interest rates are low, the cumulative changes over time are large, 
a conclusion similar to that of Dahlby and West for a single insurance product and one geographic 
market. Overall, the results point towards pricing strategies by banks that complicate consumer 
learning and perpetuate price dispersion in the markets. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical support for the hypothesis that customers’ search costs affect the 
level and dispersion of interest rates on loans and deposits by Spanish banks. The evidence 
supports the predictions from the search model proposed by Carlson and McAfee (1983) to explain 
price formation in markets with heterogeneous sellers and buyers with uniformly distributed search 
costs. That model predicts that the level of average prices in the market will decrease with the 
number of firms and that price dispersion will increase as the number of firms also increases, for a 
given distribution of marginal costs of the firms in the market. We find that, as the number of banks 
increases in a market, deposit (loan) interest rates tend to increase (decrease) while dispersion in 
interest rates in both markets increases with the number of banks. 
We also find that the average level and dispersion of interest rates of loans are significantly 
explained by the level and dispersion of interest rates of deposits, which is consistent with theories 
of the banking firm that imply vertical integration between loans and deposits in banking decisions. 
Therefore, besides informing the literature of search costs, the results of the paper are also of 
interest for the theory of the banking firm and for the implementation of monetary policy. 
We perform a product-by-product analysis (twelve loan products and ten 
deposit products) because any attempt to aggregate a set of bank products into a common model 
for all of them was empirically rejected (i.e., econometric tests gave strong evidence 
of model misspecification). Each bank product is more properly described as a separate market, 
where interest rate formation is the result of a competitive dynamic substantially different from the 
rest of the products. One implication of this evidence is that, besides the general conclusion about 
search costs as determinants of loan and deposit interest rates, there are some products for which 
the evidence is more conclusive than for others. This result suggests that there are other structural 
factors affecting the level and dispersion of interest rates of loans and deposits. In this respect, 
switching costs, informative advertising, and interest-rate smoothing are potential factors that 
explain interest rate formation and that should be accounted for in future research. 
The results of the paper also show that brick-and-mortar markets can work quite 
differently from Internet markets under consumers’ search costs. It will be interesting to see how 
the results of our paper may change with the diffusion of Internet banking. 
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TABLE 1. EVOLUTION OF INTEREST RATES: AVERAGE AND DISPERSION ACROSS PROVINCES (%) 
 
 
 
Year Interbank Average Std. Dev. p90%-p10% Coeff. variation Average Std. Dev. p90%-p10% Coeff. variation
1989 14.39 15.94 1.22 2.72 0.08 15.24 1.14 2.70 0.08
1990 14.76 17.03 1.42 2.89 0.08 16.62 1.20 2.63 0.07
1991 13.20 16.22 1.65 3.87 0.10 16.24 1.20 3.05 0.07
1992 13.01 15.75 1.44 3.29 0.09 15.08 0.89 2.26 0.06
1993 12.25 14.72 2.15 5.08 0.15 13.90 1.71 4.66 0.12
1994 7.81 11.15 1.89 4.46 0.17 10.23 0.98 2.51 0.10
1995 8.98 11.88 1.78 4.19 0.15 10.97 0.98 2.70 0.09
1996 7.65 10.16 1.90 4.58 0.19 9.40 1.11 2.91 0.12
1997 5.49 7.82 1.57 3.82 0.20 6.90 0.66 1.71 0.10
1998 4.34 6.50 1.53 3.44 0.24 5.65 0.46 1.21 0.08
1999 2.72 5.54 1.66 4.04 0.30 4.68 0.49 1.24 0.11
2000 4.11 6.75 1.55 3.75 0.23 5.72 0.62 1.61 0.11
2001 4.36 6.69 1.51 3.73 0.23 5.72 0.59 1.56 0.10
2002 3.28 5.99 1.71 4.05 0.28 4.79 0.40 1.06 0.08
2003 2.75 5.60 1.90 4.24 0.34 4.12 0.38 0.99 0.09
Year Interbank Average Std. Dev. p90%-p10% Coeff. variation Average Std. Dev. p90%-p10% Coeff. variation
1989 14.39 7.92 1.62 4.42 0.21 9.79 1.20 2.90 0.12
1990 14.76 9.15 1.84 5.35 0.20 10.84 1.46 3.61 0.14
1991 13.20 8.74 1.80 5.06 0.21 10.45 1.37 3.32 0.13
1992 13.01 8.12 1.70 4.64 0.21 10.10 1.28 3.08 0.13
1993 12.25 7.46 1.90 5.56 0.25 9.51 1.57 3.95 0.16
1994 7.81 5.32 1.38 4.17 0.26 6.93 0.88 1.96 0.13
1995 8.98 5.09 1.18 3.12 0.23 7.93 1.02 2.62 0.13
1996 7.65 4.42 1.18 3.16 0.27 6.47 1.05 2.63 0.16
1997 5.49 3.18 1.05 2.81 0.33 4.41 0.97 1.91 0.22
1998 4.34 2.43 0.83 2.34 0.34 3.29 0.73 1.61 0.22
1999 2.72 1.61 0.59 1.40 0.37 2.30 0.59 1.41 0.26
2000 4.11 1.98 0.83 2.10 0.42 3.44 0.86 2.24 0.25
2001 4.36 2.18 0.92 2.41 0.42 3.49 0.76 1.76 0.22
2002 3.28 1.73 0.68 1.74 0.39 2.85 0.56 1.30 0.20
2003 2.75 1.50 0.61 1.58 0.40 2.38 0.48 0.90 0.20
Note.- P90%-P10%  is the difference between the  90th percentile  and the 10th percentile of the product interest-rate distribution. We call it range  in the paper.
LOAN RATES
CREDIT LINES MORTGAGES
DEPOSIT RATES
CURRENT ACCOUNTS DEPOSITS
 TABLE 2. CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOURCES OF VARIATION OF INTEREST RATES. 
This table presents, for loans and deposits, the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) applied to the interest 
rates net of the interbank rate. The dependent variable is rijmt – It for loans and It - rijmt for deposits, where It is the 
interbank interest rate at period t and rijmt is the interest rate quoted by bank j in product i in province m at time t. 
This dependent variable is regressed over four groups of dummy variables, identifying time (at), product class (ai), 
bank (aj), and province (am). The contribution of the province has been computed without the ai group as the 
province effect is an average of the banks operating in the province. Column Contribution shows the contribution of 
each group of dummy variables to explain the observed variation, and the Column F-test shows the p-value of the 
test of nullity of each group of dummy variables. The bottom of the table presents the R2 and number of 
observations of each regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contribution F-test Contribution F-test
Time 46.65% *** 0.00 4.29% *** 0.00
Product class 11.84% *** 0.00 86.87% *** 0.00
Bank 26.55% *** 0.00 7.39% *** 0.00
Province 1.78% *** 0.00 1.05% *** 0.00
R2
Observations 1,216,714 1,049,757
Loans Deposits
66.64% 63.58%
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 TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
NBANKS
mt is the number of banks with transactions in product i in province m at period t. DENBRANCHmt  is the density of branches (total number of bank branches per square 
kilometer) in province m at period t. Avg r
mt
deposit and Sd r
mt
deposit are, respectively, the average level and standard deviation of the interest rates of Deposit products net of product and 
bank effects. POPULATION
mt is the population of province m at time t. PINCOMEmt t  is the per-capita GDP in thousands of constant (1995) euros in province m at time t. Dimt is the 
specific inflation of product i in province m during period t. SHARENA
mt is the percentage of the banks in province m at time t that operate nationwide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation Average Std. Deviation
1989 29.89 13.83 0.079 0.098 2.06 0.89 28.52 1.81 788361 920380 9.79 2.10 3.25 2.13 19.92 8.22
1990 29.59 13.37 0.086 0.106 2.06 1.10 27.06 1.96 795112 929647 10.06 2.07 2.00 2.50 28.72 9.35
1991 32.46 13.69 0.086 0.107 0.55 1.03 26.90 1.93 774961 915272 10.27 2.12 2.91 2.48 29.61 9.37
1992 34.02 13.99 0.087 0.108 -4.31 1.01 28.05 1.87 780231 920526 10.30 2.12 2.46 2.55 29.63 9.14
1993 35.04 13.97 0.086 0.108 -5.64 1.09 27.64 1.57 793173 935120 10.20 2.06 6.74 4.73 34.66 9.67
1994 35.10 13.65 0.086 0.110 -3.86 1.05 23.71 1.78 801882 944955 10.37 2.12 5.26 3.54 34.62 9.32
1995 35.62 13.87 0.088 0.114 -0.99 0.79 22.46 1.95 806444 948963 10.60 2.22 3.62 2.78 34.91 9.02
1996 35.31 13.72 0.090 0.117 -2.02 0.90 25.86 1.48 790820 924700 10.82 2.26 7.24 3.07 35.27 8.83
1997 37.29 13.37 0.091 0.120 -3.49 1.55 31.82 1.40 792615 929614 11.20 2.40 7.29 3.72 35.43 8.61
1998 36.40 12.91 0.094 0.124 -3.78 1.86 38.89 1.65 794409 934548 11.60 2.47 6.66 4.73 38.35 8.71
1999 36.37 11.99 0.094 0.125 -0.78 1.21 34.86 1.28 801431 943728 11.99 2.53 8.67 5.84 37.28 8.62
2000 35.23 11.12 0.094 0.126 5.12 0.93 28.41 1.16 807166 952926 12.42 2.64 8.06 4.25 37.94 8.93
2001 35.76 10.80 0.093 0.125 4.41 0.86 28.96 1.00 819447 975604 12.91 2.74 6.03 5.75 36.61 8.95
2002 35.82 10.26 0.092 0.125 5.68 0.96 28.76 1.08 833851 1000524 13.26 2.77 3.70 3.11 35.24 8.73
2003 36.67 10.11 0.094 0.127 5.74 1.46 29.03 1.03 851473 1033847 13.71 2.85 9.30 4.46 35.15 8.64
PINCOMEmtPOPULATIONmtAvg rm,t
deposit (%) SHARENAmt (%)Dimt (%) Sd rm,t
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 TABLE 4. DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST RATE DIFFERENCES ACROSS PROVINCES 
The dependent variable is ln rijtm – ln It, where rijtm  is the interest rate of product i quoted in province m at time t by bank j and It is the interbank interest rate.   NBANKSmt is the 
number of banks with transactions in product i in province m at period t; DENBRANCHmt   is the density of branches (number of branches per square kilometer) in province m at period 
t; LEV rdeposit  is the average of the interest rates of the Deposit products; Dimt  is the specific inflation of product i in province m during period t; SHARENAmt   is the percentage of the 
banks in province m at time t that operate nationwide; POPULATIONmt is the population of province m at time t; PINCOMEmt is the GDP per capita of the province. All the explanatory 
variables but Dimt and SHARENAmt are expressed in logarithms. We have estimated the coefficients with instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of NBANKS, 
DENBRANCH and LEV rdeposit, using the lags t-2 and t-3. All of the estimations contain time, bank, and province dummy variables. The last column presents the F-statistics from the 
tests of aggregate significance of the time, province, and bank groups of dummy variables, where the number of observations is displayed in the table and the number of restrictions is 
250. All of the tests reject the null hypothesis of insignificance. 
 
DEPOSIT PRODUCTS
DEPOSITSless3months -0.042 1.968 * -1.869 -1.129 -0.869 0.555 21,767 4761.2
DEPOSITS3months-6months 0.296 ** 0.020 -0.110 -0.193 0.804 0.111 26,090 2891.6
DEPOSITS6months-1year 0.144 * 0.214 * -0.477 ** -0.367 * -3.125 *** 0.145 26,365 2854.3
DEPOSITS1year-2years 0.010 0.173 -0.603 *** -0.387 * -2.009 ** -0.011 25,992 4827.1
DEPOSITSmore2years 0.094 0.470 ** -0.950 *** 0.086 -1.851 ** -0.269 20,582 1394.1
REPOless3months 0.122 ** 0.324 ** -0.416 ** 0.148 0.524 -0.025 25,664 2592.0
REPO3months-6months 0.048 0.261 * -0.329 -0.142 -1.261 0.159 22,686 1985.2
REPO6months-1year 0.167 * 0.035 -0.578 -0.301 -2.819 * 0.439 20,486 1403.6
CURRENT 0.604 0.037 * -0.216 -0.297 -0.234 0.061 28,754 1570.7
SAVINGS -0.707 0.071 ** 1.142 -0.355 -0.483 -0.361 *** 24,836 452.6
LOAN PRODUCTS
RECEIVABLEless3months 0.008 0.014 0.105 *** -0.010 0.020 -0.685 *** -0.009 25,193 587.8
RECEIVABLE3months-1year -0.014 ** 0.017 0.038 *** 0.012 0.029 -0.686 *** -0.036 24,632 665.0
RECEIVABLE1year-3years -0.014 0.021 0.039 *** 0.012 0.050 -0.053 0.017 17,964 186.6
CREDITLINEless3months -0.031 ** 0.042 * 0.137 *** -0.107 ** -0.005 -0.607 *** 0.088 * 18,181 411.9
CREDITLINE3months-1year -0.013 0.021 0.123 *** -0.019 -0.013 -0.407 ** -0.013 24,141 664.7
CREDITLINE1year-3years -0.018 * -0.008 0.162 *** -0.010 0.015 -0.626 *** -0.058 * 25,892 673.2
CREDITLINEmore3years -0.003 0.027 0.250 *** -0.062 * -0.001 -0.137 0.006 15,932 412.7
PERSONALless3months -0.056 * 0.101 ** 0.408 *** -0.102 * 0.003 -0.616 *** -0.122 * 22,177 442.6
PERSONAL3months-1year -0.080 *** 0.086 ** 0.130 *** -0.043 -0.064 -0.439 ** -0.163 *** 26,358 670.9
PERSONAL1year-3years -0.099 *** 0.033 0.032 ** -0.033 -0.039 -0.531 ** -0.152 *** 27,091 958.5
PERSONALmore3years -0.022 0.021 0.059 *** 0.007 -0.007 -0.639 ** -0.078 * 26,440 751.1
MORTGAGEmore3years -0.031 *** -0.024 ** 0.093 *** 0.001 -0.012 -0.166 -0.065 *** 25,598 699.6
Notes.-   (***)= Significant at 1%.  (**)=Significant at 5%.   (*)= Significant at 1%.
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 TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF THE DISPERSION (COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION) OF INTEREST RATES ACROSS PROVINCES 
The dependent variable is the coefficient of variation across banks of interest rates of product i quoted in province m at time t. NBANKSmt is the number of banks with transactions in 
product i in province m at period t; DENBRANCHmt is the density of branches (number of branches per square kilometer) in province m at period t; CV rmtdeposit is the coefficient of 
variation of the interest rates of the Deposit products; Dimt is the specific inflation of product i in province m during period t; SHARENAmt is the percentage of the banks in province m at 
time t that operate nationwide; POPULATIONmt is the population of province m at time t; PINCOMEmt is the GDP per capita of the province. All of the explanatory variables but Dimt and 
SHARENAmt are expressed in logarithms. We have estimated the coefficients through the GMM-system technique (first step) to take into account potential problems of persistence and 
endogeneity in the number of banks, branches and cost of deposits. All of the estimations contain time dummy variables. The coefficients are expressed in their long term value. We 
report the p-values of Sargan's test of overidentifying restrictions and second-order autocorrelation tests, whose null hypotheses are, respectively, compatibility of orthogonality 
conditions and absence of second-order autocorrelation in the error term. The last column presents the F-statistics from the tests of aggregate significance of the time and province 
effects, where the number of observations is 750 and the number of restrictions is 64 in all of the regressions. All of the tests reject the null hypothesis of non-significance. 
 
DEPOSIT PRODUCTS
DEPOSITSless3months 0.045 *** -0.015 * -0.003 -0.018 * -0.406 *** -0.008 0.758 0.336 105.1
DEPOSITS3months-6months 0.003 0.011 *** -0.013 ** -0.027 *** -0.971 *** -0.003 0.930 0.813 64.2
DEPOSITS6months-1year -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.654 ** -0.009 0.849 0.055 339.9
DEPOSITS1year-2years -0.008 0.017 -0.016 ** -0.031 ** -0.671 ** -0.009 0.917 0.502 140.9
DEPOSITSmore2years 0.011 0.008 * -0.009 ** -0.027 *** 0.203 *** 0.013 0.724 0.250 206.3
REPOless3months 0.040 * -0.021 * 0.015 0.007 0.821 ** 0.008 0.942 0.920 79.2
REPO3months-6months 0.006 -0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.280 * -0.022 * 0.836 0.112 320.8
REPO6months-1year -0.008 0.014 -0.010 * -0.019 * 0.278 * 0.002 0.718 0.245 219.7
CURRENT 0.031 ** -0.004 0.006 0.002 -0.340 * -0.022 0.929 0.229 245.3
SAVINGS 0.071 ** -0.057 *** 0.039 ** 0.066 -0.063 0.032 0.991 0.189 274.1
LOAN PRODUCTS
RECEIVABLEless3months -0.007 -0.015 *** -0.014 0.022 *** 0.008 0.122 0.008 0.930 0.251 173.1
RECEIVABLE3months-1year 0.014 * 0.005 0.031 * -0.004 -0.022 ** -0.162 0.026 ** 0.799 0.212 129.1
RECEIVABLE1year-3years 0.037 ** 0.002 0.058 -0.008 -0.025 * -0.095 0.015 0.801 0.143 61.0
CREDITLINEless3months 0.018 -0.012 0.124 ** 0.013 -0.015 0.149 0.018 0.849 0.536 179.9
CREDITLINE3months-1year -0.004 -0.005 ** -0.065 -0.005 -0.015 *** -0.329 0.002 0.923 0.227 550.4
CREDITLINE1year-3years 0.002 -0.001 -0.139 *** -0.001 -0.007 0.155 -0.003 0.934 0.155 495.5
CREDITLINEmore3years 0.052 ** -0.008 0.159 -0.002 -0.043 ** -0.506 ** 0.020 0.973 0.105 112.0
PERSONALless3months 0.026 ** 0.000 -0.090 0.006 0.013 0.028 0.048 *** 0.815 0.833 254.1
PERSONAL3months-1year 0.014 * -0.003 0.426 ** 0.004 0.009 -1.590 ** -0.021 0.856 0.813 244.5
PERSONAL1year-3years 0.009 0.017 -0.296 -0.015 -0.041 0.085 -0.012 0.853 0.943 203.9
PERSONALmore3years 0.013 ** -0.038 * 0.292 -0.032 -0.057 -4.382 *** -0.062 0.879 0.321 82.8
MORTGAGEmore3years 0.009 *** 0.001 0.111 ** 0.003 0.000 0.660 *** 0.007 0.841 0.183 32.1
Notes.-   (***)= Significant at 1%.  (**)=Significant at 5%.   (*)= Significant at 1%.
NBANKS DENBRANCH CV r deposit POPULATION PINCOME D imt SHARENA Sargan test
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 TABLE 6. DETERMINANTS OF THE DISPERSION (RANGE) OF RESIDUAL INTEREST RATES ACROSS PROVINCES 
The dependent variable is the range (difference between percentiles 90th and 10th divided by the average of the distribution) across banks of interest rates of product i quoted in 
province m at time t. NBANKSmt is the number of banks with transactions in product i in province m at period t; DENBRANCHmt is the density of branches (number of branches per 
square kilometer) in province m at period t; Range rmtdeposit is the range of the interest rates (divided by their average) of the Deposit products; Dimt is the specific inflation of product i 
in province m during period t; SHARENAmt is the percentage of the banks in province m at time t that operate nationwide; POPULATIONmt is the population of province m at time t; 
PINCOMEmt is the GDP per capita of the province. All the explanatory variables but Dimt and SHARENAmt are expressed in logarithms. We have estimated the coefficients through the 
GMM-system technique (first step) to take into account potential problems of persistence and endogeneity in the numbers of banks and branches and the cost of deposits. All of the 
estimations contain time dummy variables. The coefficients are expressed in their long-term value. We report the p-values of Sargan's test of overidentifying restrictions and second-
order autocorrelation tests, whose null hypotheses are, respectively, compatibility of orthogonality conditions and absence of second-order autocorrelation in the error term. The last 
column presents the F-statistics from the tests of aggregate significance of the time and province effects, where the number of observations is 750 and the number of restrictions is 64 
in all the regressions. All of the tests reject the null hypothesis of non-significance. 
  
DEPOSIT PRODUCTS
DEPOSITSless3months -0.104 0.012 0.008 -0.001 -0.642 -0.014 0.954 0.300 77.8
DEPOSITS3months-6months 0.011 ** -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.528 0.010 0.878 0.986 47.7
DEPOSITS6months-1year -0.007 -0.007 0.002 -0.008 -1.566 * -0.004 0.767 0.928 116.3
DEPOSITS1year-2years -0.030 * 0.013 -0.005 -0.036 -0.040 -0.035 0.870 0.844 68.8
DEPOSITSmore2years 0.012 0.008 -0.011 -0.045 1.250 *** 0.049 0.708 0.442 56.0
REPOless3months 0.105 ** -0.016 -0.008 -0.041 0.897 0.044 0.746 0.043 171.1
REPO3months-6months 0.045 * 0.011 -0.017 -0.062 *** -1.109 *** -0.011 0.959 0.124 396.6
REPO6months-1year -0.040 0.020 -0.016 -0.041 -0.189 0.014 0.912 0.481 196.4
CURRENT 0.123 ** 0.007 -0.003 -0.040 0.917 -0.072 0.728 0.702 76.9
SAVINGS 0.180 ** -0.034 * 0.001 -0.046 1.292 *** 0.105 0.853 0.059 99.7
LOAN PRODUCTS
RECEIVABLEless3months -0.048 -0.027 * -0.166 0.057 *** -0.019 0.884 -0.011 0.782 0.286 88.7
RECEIVABLE3months-1year 0.004 -0.003 0.029 0.016 -0.024 1.983 *** 0.031 0.861 0.058 80.9
RECEIVABLE1year-3years 0.044 *** 0.008 0.482 *** -0.016 -0.053 ** -0.895 ** 0.077 *** 0.887 0.462 48.2
CREDITLINEless3months 0.036 -0.008 0.625 *** 0.008 -0.043 -0.182 -0.002 0.794 0.236 218.6
CREDITLINE3months-1year 0.008 -0.020 * -0.157 -0.023 * -0.052 ** -0.630 0.035 0.769 0.825 287.4
CREDITLINE1year-3years -0.012 0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.011 0.645 ** -0.025 0.888 0.911 400.6
CREDITLINEmore3years 0.077 -0.041 ** 0.287 * 0.025 0.002 -0.433 0.034 0.728 0.007 63.6
PERSONALless3months -0.194 -0.007 0.064 0.046 0.044 -1.742 *** 0.088 0.808 0.225 116.9
PERSONAL3months-1year -0.097 0.017 0.855 *** 0.016 0.053 0.187 -0.023 0.818 0.622 152.8
PERSONAL1year-3years -0.023 -0.027 -0.290 -0.007 -0.027 0.455 0.082 * 0.955 0.871 216.3
PERSONALmore3years -0.032 -0.030 ** -0.157 0.011 0.022 -1.056 ** -0.030 0.906 0.195 191.1
MORTGAGEmore3years 0.051 *** 0.000 0.035 0.016 *** -0.001 0.425 -0.016 0.790 0.192 65.8
Notes.-   (***)= Significant at 1%.  (**)=Significant at 5%.   (*)= Significant at 1%.
NBANKS DENBRANCH RANGE r deposit POPULATION PINCOME D imt SHARENA Sargan test
Autocorrela
tion test
F-statistic 
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